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FAILURE OF CONSIDERATION 





Roxborough v Rothmans,1 recently decided by the High Court of Australia, is 
concerned with ‘failure of consideration’ as the ground for a claim to recover a 
payment made under a contract, and the characterisation of such a claim as a 
restitutionary claim based on unjust enrichment. In my view the approach 
taken is misconceived and is liable to be damaging to the law of contract. 
  The Business Franchise Licences (Tobacco) Act 1987 (NSW) provided 
that it was illegal to sell tobacco in New South Wales without a licence. The 
licence fee was calculated as a percentage of the value of the licensee’s 
tobacco sales over a specified period. Sales of tobacco bought from a 
licensee were excluded from the assessment, so that a retailer who bought all 
his tobacco from a licensed wholesaler would not have to pay any licence fee 
in respect of its sales.2 In Roxborough, Rothmans was a tobacco wholesaler 
and Roxborough a retailer supplied by Rothmans. Under the supply contract 
between them, the price for a consignment of tobacco was broken down into 
two parts, the price for the tobacco itself, and the ‘tobacco licence fee’, which 
was the licence fee payable by Rothmans in respect of the tobacco supplied. 
Thus the arrangement was that Rothmans would pay the licence fee and pass 
on the cost to Roxborough, who would of course pass it on to consumers. 
Because Rothmans was a licensed wholesaler, Roxborough was not liable to 
pay any further licence fee in respect of its own sales of the tobacco supplied 
by Rothmans. The payment by Roxborough of a sum representing the 
                                                 
* Law Department, Brunel University.  
1 Roxborough & Ors v Rothmans of Pall Mall Australia Ltd [2001] HCA 68. The judgments of 
the majority were along the same lines, and decisions on which the majority judgments were 
broadly consistent will be referred to as decisions of the court. 
tobacco licence fee ‘funded [Rothmans] to meet a cost of continuing in 
business for ... future licence periods, to the mutual benefit of both wholesaler 
and retailer’.3  
 It had previously been held that the licensing scheme was invalid as a 
disguised excise duty, which the New South Wales Parliament had no power 
to impose under the Australian Federal Constitution.4 The recovery of money 
paid as licence fees to the government of New South Wales was governed by 
a separate statute and was not in issue in Roxborough. The issue at stake 
was whether, since it was now known that Rothmans did not have to pay the 
licence fee, Roxborough could recover the part of the price paid that was 
attributable to it. Otherwise it would seem that Rothmans would be left with an 
unjustified surplus from the contract. References below to the recovery of the 
payment refer to the recovery of this part of the total payment.  
 The court denied that there was any contractual claim to recover the 
payment. Such a claim, it was thought, would have to be based on an implied 
term in the contract to the effect that the sum paid in respect of the tobacco 
licence fee would be repayable if Rothmans was not liable to pay a licence 
fee. According to the court, it would be ‘artificial and unconvincing’ to find such 
a term, because the parties ‘made no agreement, express or implied, about 
what was to happen if the tax was held to be invalid’.5 The contingency that 
arose was not provided for in the contract.  
 
The claim based on failure of consideration as a failure of condition  
It was held, however, that there was a non-contractual claim to recover the 
payment. This was a form of the claim traditionally described as a claim for 
money had and received, and nowadays as a restitutionary claim, the ground 
for which in the present circumstances was ‘failure of consideration’. This was 
understood to mean that the payment was made on a basis or a condition or 
                                                                                                                                            
2 Save for a nominal sum. 
3 Para 54, per Gummow J; see also para 16, per Gleeson CJ, Gaudron  and Hayne JJ.  
4 Ha v New South Wales (1997) 189 CLR 465. 
5 Gleeson CJ et al, para 20; see also Gummow J, para 60; Kirby J, para 157. Similarly, there 
was no implied term to the effect that Rothmans was obliged to pay the licence fee: see below 
n 25. 
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for a purpose that was not fulfilled.6 (For convenience, below I will use 
‘condition’ to cover all of these.7) It is said that such a claim can arise in a 
non-contractual situation,8 for example where the payor makes a payment 
subject to the condition that the recipient will get married. But also, according 
to the court in Roxborough, where there is a contract between the parties, a 
non-contractual, restitutionary claim can arise in respect of a payment under 
the contract. The court found that the invalidity of the tobacco licensing 
scheme meant that the tobacco licence fee was paid ‘on a basis that later 
became falsified …[i.e.] failed to sustain itself’,9 or for a purpose that failed.10  
 ‘Failure of consideration’ is of ancient provenance as a ground for 
recovering a contractual payment, but the interpretation in terms of failure of 
condition is modern. This interpretation is very widely accepted, but this 
seems to be the case not so much because of explicit support for it in the 
case law, as because it is an aspect of the theory of unjust enrichment as the 
basis for restitutionary claims.11 The failure of condition is understood as an 
‘unjust factor’ meaning that, on the present facts, the enrichment of Rothmans 
was unjust and should be reversed in favour of Roxborough.12 There was 
some support in the judgments for saying that the claim was based on a 
general principle of unjust enrichment.13
 It has always been the rule that the claim to recover a contractual 
payment arises only if there has been a total failure of consideration, which 
means that the defendant has not performed any part of his side of the 
contract. Gummow J noted that, where the payment is clearly apportioned by 
the contract between different parts of the defendant’s contractual 
                                                 
6 In this respect Gummow J’s approach follows the standard approach found in the restitution 
literature, eg, P. Birks, Introduction to the Law of Restitution (Clarendon Press, rev edn 1989), 
224. For a recent account, see R.B. Grantham & C.E.F. Rickett, Enrichment and Restitution in 
New Zealand (Hart, 2000), 147-177. 
7 ‘Condition’ is not used in the sense of a contractual term breach of which justifies 
termination.  
8 See para 16, per Gleeson CJ et al; para 102, per Gummow J.  
9 Para 60, per Gummow J; para 17 per Gleeson CJ.  
10 Para 61, per Gummow J. 
11 The approach is found in most restitution books, most importantly Birks, above n 6, and is 
attributed to Fibrosa Spolka Akcyjna v Fairbairn Lawson Combe Barbour [1943] AC 32. See 
also at n 49 below. 
12 This is the expression coined by Birks: for a summary of ‘unjust factors’, see P Birks and R 
Chambers, The Restitution Research Resource (2nd edn, Mansfield Press, 1997). 
13 See para 26, per Gleeson CJ et al, citing Commissioner of State Revenue (Vict) v Royal 
Insurance Australia Ltd (1994) 182 CLR 51. Gummow J was more sceptical: para 72-75. 
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performance – e.g., where there are phases of the contract to each of which is 
apportioned a specified part of the overall price – the total failure requirement 
can be applied separately with respect to each part.14 Here, because the 
supply contract explicitly distinguished between that part of the total price that 
was attributable to the supply of the tobacco itself, and that part that was 
attributable to the tobacco licence fee, it was possible to say that there was a 
total failure with respect to the latter part of the payment. 
 
Objections to the non-contractual ‘failure of condition’ analysis  
Roxborough explicitly adopts the failure of condition analysis, but in my view 
there are serious difficulties with this approach, and (as explained below) 
there is a better way to understand the concept of failure of consideration and 
to explain the decision. One problem concerns the nature of the condition (or 
basis, purpose etc) that is said to govern a payment for the purposes of the 
doctrine of failure of consideration. Is a payment conditional merely because 
the payor decided that this was to be the case? In a non-contractual situation, 
can A make a payment to B that is free of any condition agreed to by B, but 
becomes repayable by B merely because A determined when he made the 
payment that he was making it subject to a certain condition – e.g. that B is to 
be married – and this condition was not subsequently fulfilled? This seems 
sometimes to have been argued,15 but it is difficult to see how any such 
principle could be justified. Why should A be able to impose such a condition 
on B, which may affect him adversely, when A could instead get B’s 
agreement to the condition before making the transfer?16 As one might 
expect, it is generally thought that for the doctrine to apply the condition must 
                                                 
14 Para 106-107.  
15 See eg P. Birks, ‘In Defence of Free Acceptance’ in A. Burrows ed., Essays on the Law of 
Restitution (Clarendon Press, 1991), 115.  
16 In the case where a payment is made for the purpose of satisfying a supposed liability, but 
the payor suspects that there may actually be no liability, it is clear that he has no claim to 
recover the payment if this turns out to be the case, because he assumed the risk of it: Kelly v 
Solari (1841) 9 M&W 54. If he is to recover the payment, the payor must first secure an 
agreement from the defendant that the payment is to be conditional on the money actually 
being due. It must follow a fortiori that a payor cannot impose a unilateral condition on the 
payment. The same principle is reflected in the rule that no claim arises in respect of an 
officiously-conferred benefit: see eg Restatement of Restitution (American Law Institute, 
1937), para 2. 
 4
be expressed by the payor and accepted by the defendant.17 But this surely 
means that the liability for repayment is based on an agreement to repay, not 
on a separate principle of unjust enrichment (or some other non-contractual 
basis), and is therefore contractual.18
 In any case, whether or not a non-contractual claim based on failure of 
a condition can arise in some circumstances, where, as in Roxborough, the 
claimant makes a payment pursuant to a valid contract, it is surely clear that it 
is made subject to the terms of the contract, and cannot also be subject to a 
condition imposed by the claimant independently of the contract. A contracting 
party who receives a contractual payment as such takes it in accordance with 
the terms of the contract. The payment may be made on a condition, but if so 
this is the case by virtue of the terms of the contract, explicit or implicit. If the 
contract provides for such a condition, then a claim arising from the failure of 
the condition will be a contractual claim. Generally, however, a payment made 
under a contract will not be conditional; it will be an unconditional, outright 
payment, made in exchange for the reciprocal performance specified in the 
contract.19 In Roxborough, although the contract identified part of the price as 
the tobacco licence fee, it contained no term providing that the payment in 
respect of the tobacco licence fee was subject to a condition making it 
repayable in the circumstances that arose. As noted above, this was 
specifically found by the court in connection with the argument for a 
contractual claim based on an implied term. Roxborough is surely inconsistent 
in holding that a payment duly made and received under a contract can be 
subject to a condition where the contract provides for the payment to be 
unconditional; and the inconsistency is not avoided by saying that that the 
condition (although apparently arising from the contract) takes effect outside 
it.  
 
The claim as a contractual reliance claim 
                                                 
17 See eg A. Burrows, The Law of Restitution (Butterworths, 1993), 251. And it is clear in 
Roxborough that the court had in mind a condition, basis, purpose etc, that was common to 
the parties: see eg para 23. 
18 One might say that without repayment the defendant would be ‘unjustly enriched’, but only 
because he has failed to satisfy a contractual liability for repayment. 
19 It is sometimes mistakenly thought that making a payment in return for something is the 
same thing as making a payment conditionally: eg Grantham & Rickett, above n 6, 150.  
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But this does not rule out the possibility of a claim to recover the payment. 
Where a payment is made under a contract, if it is justified to require 
repayment this is because in some respect the contract has not gone as 
agreed and in consequence the reversal of the payment is the appropriate 
contractual remedy. The reason why a claim for the reversal of a payment 
might appear not to be contractual (where there is no contractual provision for 
repayment in the circumstances) is the assumption that a contractual claim 
must be for expectation damages. This in turn follows from the assumption 
that a contractual claim necessarily arises to correct a breach by the 
defendant of his duty to perform the contract. A breach of duty is aptly 
remedied by placing the person owed the duty in the position he would have 
been in if the duty had been fulfilled,20 and so in relation to a breach of 
contractual duty it should take the form of a claim for expectation damages 
representing the value of the duty that the claimant was owed.21 But it is 
surely clear also that a contracting party is entitled to act in reliance on a 
contract by performing at the risk of the other party, in the sense that he 
should be protected by the other party in respect of reliance loss incurred 
through performance. It is recognised that a contracting party who incurs 
expenditure pursuant to a contract has a claim for ‘reliance damages’. This is 
surely the obvious explanation for the recovery of a contractual payment – it is 
a contractual claim to be protected in respect of loss incurred through reliance 
on the contract.  
 Of course, where a contracting party has incurred a reliance loss 
through a payment to the other party, he should be able to recover the 
payment only insofar as his loss has not been satisfied by the receipt of the 
reciprocal benefit that he was due under the contract. Where a contracting 
party makes a payment and then receives the performance he is due in 
return, obviously he should have no claim for reliance loss. His net reliance 
loss is nil, because the benefit he has received from the other party’s 
performance must be taken to be at least equivalent to his loss through the 
                                                 
20 See eg D. Friedman, ‘The Performance Interest in Contract Damages’ [1995] LQR 195. 
21 If specific performance is not awarded.   
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payment, since he agreed to the exchange.22 But if a contracting party has 
made a payment and not had the benefit of any reciprocal performance at all, 
he should be able to recover the full amount of the payment as a reliance 
loss. If he has received only part of the benefit due, it would seem that prima 
facie he should be able to recover the proportion of his payment attributable to 
that part of the benefit due that he has not received. The effect of the doctrine 
of total failure is that no such proportionate recovery is allowed unless the 
contract itself makes an apportionment of the total payment amongst different 
parts of the reciprocal performance. The claim to recover the payment is not 
based on a condition governing the payment, whether by virtue of a term of 
the contract or on some non-contractual basis. It arises from the right of the 
contracting party to be protected in respect of his reliance on the contract, by 
virtue of which the reversal of the payment is the appropriate contractual 
remedy in the circumstances. 
 This suggests that Roxborough should have been approached as 
follows. Roxborough paid a sum of money in reliance on performance by 
Rothmans as specified in the supply contract. If it is right to say that the 
contract distinguished between two parts of Rothmans’ contractual 
performance, viz., (1) the supply of the cigarettes to Roxborough and (2) the 
payment of the tobacco licence fee, and that the total payment due was 
apportioned by the contract between these two parts of the defendant’s 
contractual performance, then the part of the payment attributable to the 
payment of the tobacco licence fee should have been recoverable by way of a 
reliance claim. The payment by Roxborough of the sum in respect of the 
tobacco licence fee constituted an outstanding reliance loss, the 
corresponding reciprocal performance not having been carried out. Thus the 
crucial issue is to define the contractual performance of Rothmans by 
construction of the supply contract: did it actually consist of supplying the 
tobacco and also paying the tobacco licence fee, or was it confined to the 
supply of the tobacco, the tobacco licence fee being mentioned in the contract 
merely by way of an explanation for the price demanded? One would think 
that the separation out of the tobacco licence fee from the rest of the price, 
                                                 
22 ie, the reliance loss is measured in terms of the implicit valuation in the contractual 
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especially given that the payment of the tobacco licence fee by Rothmans 
served Roxborough’s interests as well as Rothmans’,23 would imply that the 
payment of the licence fee by Rothmans was indeed part of its contractual 
performance. This was the decision of the court; as Gummow J held:24 ‘The 
parties contracted not only for the supply of the tobacco products but also … 
with respect to the renewal of the wholesaler’s licence and the funding for that 
to take place.’ (Gummow J considered this to be relevant to the issue 
discussed above, i.e., whether the payment was made conditionally, so as to 
generate a non-contractual claim based on failure of condition.) The position 
of the claimant in Roxborough can be contrasted with that of a customer of 
the retailer (Roxborough) in the same situation. Here it seems clear that no 
part of the price paid is apportioned to the payment of tax: the retailer’s side of 
the contract is purely to provide the cigarettes. If this is the position, there 
should be no question of any recovery of part of the price by the customer. 
 One might object that if, as was held by the court,25 Rothmans had no 
contractual obligation to pay the tobacco licence fee, then this could not be 
part of its contractual performance for the purposes of the argument above. 
But in principle a contract can provide for the exchange of a specified 
payment for a specified performance, without necessarily implying an 
obligation to provide the specified performance.26 The effect is that reliance 
on the specified contractual performance by way of payment is protected 
through a reliance claim in the event that the performance is not provided. It is 
not necessary, in other words, for the defendant to have an obligation to do X 
in order for the claimant to be able to recover for his reliance loss incurred on 
the assumption that the defendant will do X.27  
 Another objection might be that in Roxborough the receipt of the 
payment by Rothmans and its consequent enrichment must surely be relevant 
to the claim (hence the invocation of a principle of unjust enrichment), and yet 
this reliance analysis seems to depend purely on Roxborough’s payment as a 
                                                                                                                                            
exchange, as discussed in P. Jaffey, The Nature and Scope of Restitution (Hart, 2000), 31. 
23 See text at n 3 above. 
24 Para 109, per Gummow J. Kirby K took a different view: para 165. 
25 Para 60, per Gummow J; para 157, per Cullinan J. But there was said to be a duty to act so 
as to ensure that Roxborough did not incur a liability for a licence fee: para 56.  
26 See further P Jaffey, ‘A New Version of the Reliance Theory’ [1998] NILQ 107. 
27 ibid at 136. 
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reliance loss, and not on its effect in enriching Rothmans. But this is not 
actually the case. The enrichment is relevant, but as an element of the 
contractual analysis. This follows from the need to protect the defendant’s 
reliance loss as well as the claimant’s, where the claim is not based on a 
breach of duty by the defendant.28 Where the claimant’s contractual reliance 
loss is by way of a payment to the defendant, the satisfaction of the claimant’s 
reliance loss by the return of the payment causes the defendant no net loss 
relative to its position when it entered the contract – i.e., no contractual 
reliance loss – because it merely removes an enrichment received through 
the contract. By contrast, where, for example, the claimant has incurred a 
reliance loss by way of expenditure pursuant to the contract, not 
corresponding to any receipt by the defendant, full recovery of the reliance 
loss would inflict a net loss on the defendant, and so might not be justifiable in 
the light of the need also to protect the defendant’s reliance on the contract.29  
 
Does it matter whether the claim is contractual? 
It is important whether the claim to recover the payment under the contract is 
contractual or not. The characterisation of a claim to reverse a payment under 
a valid contract as a non-contractual claim based on unjust enrichment or 
some other principle is liable to subvert the law of contract. To put the point in 
general terms, it is one of the functions of contract law to determine the rights 
and liabilities of the parties arising from the non-performance of the contract 
(including conditions specified in the contract). In principle, the various 
responses should constitute a coherent set reflecting certain assumptions 
about the nature of a contract and the interests of the parties. To take out one 
aspect of this general issue and treat it as governed by separate non-
contractual principles is liable to make the overall set of responses to non-
performance incoherent. 
                                                 
28 Where both parties are innocent they must both be entitled to protection for their reliance - 
typically in a case of frustration. The measure of the claimant’s claim must reflect this. 
Protection for the defendant’s reliance does not arise in relation to an expectation damages 
claim based on a breach of duty. 
29 Thus, for example, on frustration a claim based on expenditure is limited by the value of the 
benefit conferred under s.1(3) Law Reform (Frustrated Contracts) Act 1943, and this would 
presumably also be the case if a claim by a party in breach were allowed, as recommended 
by the Law Commission (LCR 121, 1983).  
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 More specifically, the contractual allocation of risk may be upset. Under 
a supply of goods contract, generally the supplier will specify a fixed price for 
the goods, and he will therefore bear the risk that his costs of making or 
obtaining the goods will differ from what he estimated when the contract was 
made, as a result of change of circumstances or misjudgment. If his costs are 
less than he, and possibly the buyer, expected when the contract was made, 
he is enriched relative to this expectation.30 The buyer may well think that he 
has had the worse of the bargain as things have turned out. But this does not 
mean that an injustice has been done or that the supplier has in some sense 
been unjustly enriched, because the enrichment of the supplier (relative to the 
expected position) represents the realisation of a risk that he took under the 
contract.31 To deprive him of this enrichment, on the basis of a non-
contractual condition, or more broadly a principle of unjust enrichment, is to 
undermine the agreed allocation of risk under the contract.32 This is unfair to 
the parties, and is also likely to cause uncertainty and therefore to hinder 
contractual negotiation, because contracting parties will be in doubt over 
whether their agreed allocation of risk will be enforceable.  
Similarly, in Roxborough, if Rothmans had accepted the payment of the 
licence fee as a part of its own costs of supplying tobacco, there could 
presumably be no objection to its unexpected profit (just as it would have had 
to bear any increase in the licence fee). But in fact the contract treated the 
payment of the licence fee not as part of the costs of performance but as a 
distinct part of Rothmans’ performance, of benefit to Roxborough in itself. No 
doubt the possibility that the licence fee might not be payable was not 
considered, but nevertheless the payment of the licence fee was separated 
out from the normal costs to be absorbed by Rothmans. The parties intended 
to treat it as outside the normal contingencies that affect the parties’ 
bargaining over price and other matters.33 The implication is surely that the 
                                                 
30 The buyer may not be in any position to form a precise expectation, and the two parties 
may have quite different expectations on this point. Conversely the buyer will bear the risk 
that the value of the goods will change – for example, he might bear the risk of a fall in their 
market price on a re-sale, or the risk that it has ceased to be possible for some reason to use 
the goods in the way he had in mind. 
31 See para 172-173, per Kirby J. 
32 A risk allocation argument was rejected by Gummow J, para 95, but without discussion. 
33 See para 13, per Gleeson CJ et al. 
 10
risk was shared, so that (since there was no prejudice to Rothmans) the 
money should be returned to Roxborough if the licence was not payable.34 
Furthermore, even if, as the court said, the risk of invalidity of the licensing 
scheme was not allocated by the contract, it does not follow that the issue is 
not a matter of contract law. Determining whether there was an allocation of 
risk, express or implied, and if not how the risk should be allocated as a 
matter of law, are intrinsically contractual issues,35 to be addressed in a 
contractual framework using the legal tools developed in this context.36  
 
‘Failure of consideration’ 
As Gummow J observed, the expression ‘failure of consideration’ does not 
refer to consideration in the ordinary sense in which it is used in contract 
law.37 A claim arises to recover a payment by virtue of ‘failure of 
consideration’ where the contract has not been performed by the defendant, 
even though the contract is valid and does not lack consideration in the 
ordinary sense. For the purposes of the claim for failure of consideration, 
consideration refers to the actual performance of the contract.38 On the 
approach in Roxborough, which reflects the approach in the restitution 
literature, the relevance of this non-performance is that it constitutes the 
failure of a condition governing the payment for the purposes of a non-
contractual claim, whereas on the reliance approach above the relevance of 
non-performance is that, in terms of the envisaged contractual exchange, the 
payment is unreciprocated.  
 One objection to the reliance interpretation of ‘failure of consideration’ 
might be that the same expression is used to refer to the ground for 
                                                 
34 Subject to any necessary protection for Rothmans: see n 28. Although the possibility that 
the licence fee might not be payable was not addressed, the contract did apparently provide 
that any increase in the licence fee after the contract was made would be passed on to 
Roxborough: see para 10; see also para 13.  
35 And even if it is right to overturn a contractual allocation of risk, this is still a contractual 
issue. 
36 In the restitution literature, this issue arises more commonly in connection with the quantum 
meruit claim for work done under an incompletely-performed contract, which is also supposed 
to be based on unjust enrichment rather than contract. Here also there is controversy over 
whether the measure of the claim should be determined by reference to the contract. For a 
survey of the arguments, see A. Skelton, Restitution and Contract (Mansfield Press, 1998). 
37 Para 103. 
38 This proposition is derived from Fibrosa Spolka Akcyjna v Fairbairn Lawson Combe 
Barbour [1943] AC 32. 
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recovering a payment under a void contract.39 This implies that it cannot refer 
to a contractual reliance claim arising from non-reciprocation under the 
contract, whereas it is thought that the non-contractual, restitutionary claim 
can arise in the same way where the contract is void because it is not 
dependent on the contract.40 But it is difficult to accept that the ground of 
recovery can be the same in relation to valid and void contracts. Where the 
contract is void, the failure of the performance specified in the contract surely 
cannot be a ground for recovery, even if it is said to operate as a non-
contractual condition.41 Surely the ground for recovery here is the voidness of 
the contract (or a mistake as to its voidness by the payor).42 It is also 
understandable that ‘failure of consideration’ came to be used to refer to 
voidness as a ground of recovery: here ‘consideration’ should be understood 
in the broad, old-fashioned sense by which it signifies a legal basis for 
enforcing a contract,43 so that absence or failure of consideration means that 
the contract is void or unenforceable.  
 It may seem curious that the single expression ‘failure of consideration’ 
is used in relation to both valid and void contracts, but in different senses. But 
there is a possible explanation of this. Where a payment made under a valid 
contract is recovered on the ground of ’failure of consideration’, as mentioned 
above the traditional requirement is that the defendant has not performed at 
all. It is possible that in this situation it might originally have been thought that 
the agreement, being executory,44 was inchoate and unenforceable,45 and 
                                                 
39 This was in issue recently in Westdeutsche Landesbank Girozentrale v Islington LBC 
[1994] 4 All ER 890. In the HL [1996] AC 669, the point was no longer in issue. 
40 P. Birks, ‘No Consideration: Restitution After Void Contracts’ (1993) 12 Univ of W Aust LR  
195. 
41 Especially if acceptance of the condition by the defendant is said to be required for the 
condition to be binding. The restitutionary failure of condition approach implies that if a 
contract, although void, is fully performed, there can be no claim to reverse a payment, but if 
the claim is based on the voidness of the contract actual performance is irrelevant. It has 
been held that full performance is no bar to recovery: Guinness Mahon v Kensington & 
Chelsea RBC [1998] 2 All ER 272. 
42 This amounts to a vitiating factor – ie, there is no proper exercise of the power to make the 
payment. This is the implication of Westdeutsche Landesbank Girozentrale v Islington LBC 
[1994] 4 All ER 890. 
43 Referred to by Gummow J, paras 101-103. 
44 Save for the payment, which is reversible. 
45 This is understandable on the basis that without reliance the defendant is not prejudiced.  
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that the basis for the recovery of the payment was the same as that for a void 
contract.46
 
Restitution, unjust enrichment and reliance 
On the argument above, the claim to recover a contractual payment on the 
ground of ’failure of consideration’ should be understood as a contractual 
reliance claim, and accordingly ‘failure of consideration’ as failure of 
contractual reciprocation. One might still wish to say that the claim is 
‘restitutionary’ – this would appear to be an apt way of indicating that it is a 
claim to reverse a payment. Unfortunately this usage is liable to cause 
confusion, because the description of a claim as ‘restitutionary’ is commonly 
understood to imply not merely that the remedy takes the form of the reversal 
of a payment, but also that the basis of the claim is non-contractual, and more 
particularly that it is the principle of unjust enrichment. 
 In Roxborough, the claim based on failure of consideration was held to 
be a non-contractual, restitutionary claim. This involved interpreting ‘failure of 
consideration’ to mean failure of condition, which has been criticised above. 
Two factors have tended to promote this misconceived approach. The first is 
the failure to appreciate the role of reliance in contract,47 which makes it 
difficult to explain how the claim to recover a contractual payment (since it is 
not a claim for expectation damages nor for a contractual debt) can arise in 
contract.48 The second factor is the development of the theory of unjust 
enrichment, which can be understood to be the theory that all claims for which 
enrichment is an element, including claims to reverse transfers, are governed 
by a single principle of unjust enrichment, and so constitute a distinct body of 
law equivalent to and separate from contract, tort or property.49 Although 
Gummow J expressed scepticism over the theory of unjust enrichment,50 
                                                 
46 This also explains the total failure requirement.  
47 This is not the only aspect of contract law that is liable to be misunderstood if reliance is 
ignored, as a number of commentators have argued. See eg Jaffey, above n 22, 32.  
48 One might argue that the claim protects the ‘restitution interest’ as a contractual interest, as 
in L.L. Fuller & W.R. Perdue, ‘The Reliance Interest in Contract Damages’ (1936) 46 Yale LJ 
52 and 373, although on their analysis the restitution interest is indistinguishable from the 
reliance interest in the case in issue.  
49 There is no canonical definition of the theory. 
50 Para 72-75. He preferred to say that restitutionary remedies arose on an ad hoc ‘gap-filling’ 
basis where appropriate to correct injustice, rather in the manner in which equity at one time 
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Roxborough nevertheless lends support to the theory by treating a claim to 
reverse a contractual payment as non-contractual, even though the contract 
was entirely valid and the payment fully voluntary. In this area, as in others,51 






                                                                                                                                            
served to rectify injustices at common law. It seems doubtful whether this approach, which is 
antithetical to the ‘search for principle’, will nowadays attract much support. 
51 This argument, referring to other such areas, is outlined in Jaffey, above n 22, Chapter 1.  
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